, in which each chapter was written by a behavioral neurologist who also "practiced" cognitive neuroscience, and highlighted the interface between the study of patients with cognitive deficits and the study of cognition in normal individuals. Each chapter began with a description of a case report, often a patient seen by the author, and described the symptoms seen in this patient, laying the foundation for the cognitive processes to be explored. After a clinical description, the authors provided a historical background about what we have learned about these particular neurobehavioral syndromes through clinical observation and neuropsychological investigation. Each chapter also explored investigations using a variety of methods-electrophysiological recording in awake-behaving monkeys, behavioral studies of normal healthy individuals, event-related potentials, and functional neuroimaging of both normal individuals and neurological patients-all aimed at understanding the neural mechanisms underlying the cognitive functions perturbed in each particular clinical syndrome. After completion of this book, I was convinced that the collection of chapters presented-although not intended to be all-encompassing-had captured the essence of cognitive neuroscience, a discipline aimed at studying the biological basis of the mind.
, in which each chapter was written by a behavioral neurologist who also "practiced" cognitive neuroscience, and highlighted the interface between the study of patients with cognitive deficits and the study of cognition in normal individuals. Each chapter began with a description of a case report, often a patient seen by the author, and described the symptoms seen in this patient, laying the foundation for the cognitive processes to be explored. After a clinical description, the authors provided a historical background about what we have learned about these particular neurobehavioral syndromes through clinical observation and neuropsychological investigation. Each chapter also explored investigations using a variety of methods-electrophysiological recording in awake-behaving monkeys, behavioral studies of normal healthy individuals, event-related potentials, and functional neuroimaging of both normal individuals and neurological patients-all aimed at understanding the neural mechanisms underlying the cognitive functions perturbed in each particular clinical syndrome. After completion of this book, I was convinced that the collection of chapters presented-although not intended to be all-encompassing-had captured the essence of cognitive neuroscience, a discipline aimed at studying the biological basis of the mind.
The idea for the book was launched at a MIT Press booth at the annual meeting of the Cognitive Neuroscience Society after one of the book editors asked me about my professional and research background. I told him I was a behavioral neurologist interested in understanding the relationship between the brain and behavior. As I talked, I could tell that he was perplexed about something, and when I finished he asked me, "Why would a neurologist come to a meeting like this?" That question perplexed me. It never occurred to me that someone would ask me that. As I thought about this exchange during the rest of the day, I realized that although the discipline of cognitive neuroscience was being "practiced" by many different individuals with many different backgrounds, we had not yet begun to fully engage in conversations with each other.
About the time I had just finished my neurology residency, someone told me their definition of cognitive neuroscience: the study of the biological basis of the mind. It sounded very much like my definition of "behavioral neurology." And when I attended my first Cognitive Neuroscience Society meeting, I noticed that the poster sessions looked very similar to those I had been visiting at the behavioral neurology sessions at the American Academy of Neurology in past years. Today, in classrooms across the country, we teach our students that the phrase "cognitive neuroscience" was coined in the late 1970s in the backseat of a New York taxi when Mike Gazzaniga was riding with the eminent cognitive psychologist George Miller to a meeting to gather scientists to join forces to study how the brain enables the mind. On neurology wards across the country, we teach our medical students and residents that the emergence of "behavioral neurology" as a subspecialty of neurology began in the 1960s, prompted by the work of the eminent neurologist Norman Geschwind. But we all know that the roots of both these disciplines are to be found deep in the nineteenth century and the work of psychologists such as Williams James and neurologists and psychiatrists such as JeanMartin Charcot, Paul Broca, Hughlings Jackson, James Papez, and Carl Wernicke. Actually, to be more historically accurate, we should recognize Hippocrates, who in the fifth century B.C. set forth the notion that it was the brain-not the heart-that was the seat of behavior. To my mind, modern behavioral neurology and cognitive neuroscience began in 1861 at the meeting of the Anthropological Society of Paris, when Dr. Paul Broca presented the history and autopsy findings of a patient who suffered an impairment in speech production such that he was capable of producing only the monosyllable "tan," which the patient repeated over and over (Broca, 1861) . Broca showed this patient's brain to his colleagues and set forth the hypothesis that this patient's deficit in speech production was due to damage of the left inferior frontal gyrus. In this
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way, the "human lesion method"-establishing the function of various parts of the brain by correlating a cognitive deficit with the location of a brain injury-provided a foundation for all other approaches that are used today aimed at the study of the relationship between brain and behavior. The roots of cognitive psychologists who turned to the study of the brain (especially those newly trained in brain imaging techniques) lay within the discipline of psychology, the study of the mind. The roots of neuroscientists who study cognition lie within the discipline of neuroscience, the study of the nervous system. Many others engaged in the study of the biological basis of the mind are grounded in psychiatry, neurology, computer science, mathematics, economics, and other disciplines. As an act of unity and purpose, all of us have agreed to call what we do "cognitive neuroscience," despite our markedly different approaches. In my opinion, the major step forward that we have made in the thirty years since the phrase was coined is that we are all having more conversations with each other.
We are having these conversations in large part due to the contributions of the greatest ambassador of cognitive neuroscience, Michael Gazzaniga, to whom we dedicate this book. Undoubtedly the neuronal networks that store the meaning of "cognitive neuroscience" light up in our brains when we hear his name. In 1989 Mike launched the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience with himself as the first editor-in-chief and five years later created the Cognitive Neuroscience Society. He edited the first comprehensive treatise on this discipline, "The Cognitive Neurosciences" (Gazzaniga & Bizzi, 1995) , and the first cognitive neuroscience textbook for undergraduates and graduate students (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002) . Each of these efforts was critical for defining as well as moving our discipline forward, both scientifically and socially. With the creation of the Summer Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, Mike has created a forum for training generations of future cognitive neuroscientists. During this summer meeting, Mike always hosts dinner parties for the speakers, bringing together cognitive neuroscientists for provocative conversations that often stimulate new ideas and collaborations. In my opinion, cognitive neuroscience will grow stronger as the number of such conversations grows. I believe that Mike recognized this from the start by, in effect, organizing one very large "dinner party" that has lasted roughly thirty years and should last for many more years to come.
Methods Used to Study the Relationship between Brain and Behavior
Early in my career I was attending a study section meeting at the National Institutes of Health when each of the panel members was asked to introduce him-or herself briefly and state their research interests. I said that I investigated "prefrontal function." My colleague, who was a psychologist, said he investigated "cognitive control." Clearly, we investigated the same phenomenon, but from different perspectives. As I have mentioned, those who practice cognitive neuroscience come from numerous backgrounds (psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience) and take numerous approaches. It is not surprising that the number of approaches has increased as rapidly as the number of questions that are being asked. To me, this is what generates the excitement in this discipline. However, despite my excitement, I offered this cautionary tale in the preface of Neurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience:
It is an exciting time for the discipline of cognitive neuroscience. In the past 10 years we have witnessed an explosion in the development and advancement of methods that allow us to precisely examine the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive processes. Functional MRI, for example, has provided markedly improved spatial and temporal resolution of brain structure and function, which has led to answers to new questions, and reexamination of old questions. However, in my opinion, the explosive impact that functional neuroimaging has had on cognitive neuroscience may in some ways be responsible for moving us away from our roots-the study of patients with brain damage as a window into the functioning of the normal brain.
What prompted this cautionary tale? Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) emerged on the scene in the early 1990s, and around the time of the publication of my book, journals and meetings were being filled to the brim with fMRI studies. For example, a PubMed and Ovid search revealed 3,426 unique fMRI articles published across 498 journals from the years 1991 to 2001. In only three years, from 1998 to 2001, the number of published articles on fMRI doubled (Illes, Kirschen, & Gabrieli, 2003) . The tables of contents of journals dedicated to studies using functional imaging, such as NeuroImage and Human Brain Why Methods Matter 207 Mapping, were increasing in size each month, and attendance at the meetings of the Organization for Human Brain Mapping began rising exponentially. A simple walk down the aisle of a poster session at the annual meeting of the Cognitive Neuroscience Society mirrored what could be seen in the explosion of writing. During this time it was alarming to me that a walk through a cognitive neuroscience poster session rarely led to a poster using patients with focal lesions to study the relationship between brain and behavior. In fact, at the 2005 Cognitive Neuroscience Society meeting, studies using patient populations made up only 16 percent of all posters, and only half of these were focused on studying brain-behavior relationships (Chatterjee, 2005) . Had studying patients with brain lesions taken a backseat to newer methods? To further explore this historical circumstance, as well as make an attempt to gaze into the future, let us take a very critical look at these two prominent cognitive neuroscience methods.
General Considerations Regarding Cognitive Neuroscience Methods
Lesion studies and functional neuroimaging studies of normal, healthy subjects provide complementary but different types of information regarding brain-behavior relationships. Clearly, both of these kinds of studies are necessary to provide an inferentially sound basis for drawing conclusions about the neural basis of cognition. Converging evidence from both types of studies is necessary because of inferential limitations of each method when performed in isolation. The nature of functional neuroimaging studies is that they support inferences about the association of a particular brain system with a cognitive process. However, functional neuroimaging is unable to prove that the observed activity is necessary for a putatively isolated cognitive process. This is because one never has perfect control over the cognitive processes in which a subject engages. An experiment may control the conditions or tasks to which a subject is exposed, but it cannot conclusively demonstrate that a subject is differentially engaging a single, identified cognitive process. It should be noted that "a more sensitive cognitive task" (as sometimes suggested by reviewers of publications) might not solve this problem, as it is always possible that the subject engages in unnecessary cognitive processes that either have no overt, measurable effects or are perfectly confounded with the process of interest. As a result, observed neural activity may be the result of some confounding neural computation that is not itself necessary for the execution of the cognitive process seemingly under study. In other words, functional neuroimaging is a correlative method (Sarter, Bernston, & Cacioppo, 1996) .
It is important to note, however, that the limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from functional neuroimaging studies applies to all methods of physiological measurement, including microelectrode recording of neurons, scalp evoked-related potentials, magnetoencephalography, hemodynamic measures, and measures of glucose metabolism. The inference that some brain region, system, or process is "necessary" cannot be drawn absent a demonstration that its inactivation disrupts the cognitive process in question.
To illustrate these issues consider the types of inferences that can be drawn from lesion versus neurophysiology studies. Single-unit recordings in awake-behaving monkeys have revealed neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) that increase their firing during a delay between the presentation of information and its later use in behavior (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Fuster & Alexander, 1971 ). These studies have been taken as evidence that the lateral prefrontal cortex represents a neural correlate of working memory, the temporary retention of information that was just experienced or just retrieved from long-term memory but no longer exists in the external environment (D'Esposito, 2007) . The necessity of this region for working memory was demonstrated in monkey studies that have shown that lateral prefrontal cortex lesions impair performance on delayed-response tasks, but not on tasks that require visual discrimination and saccades (rapid intermittent eye movement) without the requirement of holding information online (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993 ). However, delayspecific neurons have also been found in the hippocampus (Cahusac, Miyashita, & Rolls, 1989; Watanabe & Niki, 1985) , a region thought to be involved in long-term memory, as opposed to working memory. Lesions of the hippocampus, however, were originally found not to impair performance on delayed-response tasks (with short delay periods) suggesting that the hippocampus may be involved in maintaining information over short periods of time but is not necessary for this cognitive
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operation (Alvarez, Zola-Morgan, & Squire, 1994) . These findings in monkeys were consistent with observations in humans. For example, the well-studied patient H.M., with complete bilateral damage to the hippocampus, had the severe inability to learn new information, but could nevertheless perform normally on working-memory tasks (Corkin, 1984) . More recent studies have been able to further characterize the precise role of the hippocampus in working memory. For example, based on complementary functional magnetic resonance imaging (Ranganath & D'Esposito, 2001 ) and lesion studies (Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006) , the hippocampus is implicated in long-term memory especially when relations between multiple items or multiple features of a complex, novel item must be retained. Thus, the hippocampus may only be engaged during working-memory tasks that require someone to subsequently remember novel information. As can be seen by this example of working memory, a stronger level of inference results from combining lesion studies and those with physiological measurements. That is, it was observed that a lesion to a cortical area impaired a given cognitive process and that the cognitive process, when engaged by intact monkeys or humans, evoked neural activity in the same cortical area. Thus, the inference that the neuroanatomical area is computationally necessary for the cognitive process is now rendered less vulnerable to the faulty assumptions noted previously for each method performed in isolation. As a result, lesion and functional neuroimaging studies are complementary, in that each provides inferential support that the other lacks.
No Cognitive Neuroscience Method Is Perfect
The perfect cognitive neuroscience method would allow noninvasive simultaneous recording of all neurons in the brain on a millisecond timescale. Obviously, the methods available at this time differ in their spatial and temporal resolution, and none of them achieve the highest resolution in both domains (see figure 14.1) . However, in addition to limitations of these methods imposed by their technical specifications, the interpretation of data derived from each method is bound by a number of conceptual constraints, many of which are inherent in the method and not fixable by technological advances.
The Lesion Method
Unlike the lesions produced in animal models, which can be created with surgical precision, lesions in human patients are often extensive, and even if they are quite focal they will follow the boundaries of the brain's blood supply. Also, certain locations in the brain are more likely to be damaged by a stroke, the most common cause of focal brain lesions in humans. For instance, the middle cerebral artery is more commonly affected by strokes than other arteries, leading to damage in the lateral frontal, parietal, and temporal cortex. Also, it is not possible to study a group of patients each with the same exact lesion location and extent. For this reason, studies have often adopted a "lesion-overlap" approach (Chao & Knight, 1998) , where a behavioral deficit is correlated with the location of the lesion that is found in all individuals. However, as Rorden and Karnath (2004) have elegantly pointed out, the conclusions drawn from such an approach are prone to error. These researchers present as an example an attempt to identify where primary vision is processed in the brain by studying patients with visual-field deficits as a result of stroke (see figure 14.2, plate 4) . The lesion-overlap analysis was first performed in patients with visual-field deficits, the researchers observing that the area of maximal overlap of their lesion was in the temporoparietal cortex. However, if one subtracts the lesion overlap of a control group, a second group of stroke patients without visual-field deficits, it is observed that the primary visual cortex within the occipital lobe is the area most commonly damaged in patients with visual-field deficits. This example illustrates how the failure to include a control group in such The data in this figure illustrate lesion-overlap analysis of 140 patients with right-hemisphere damage due to stroke. The top panel shows the distribution of lesion frequency of patients with visual-field deficits showing maximal overlap of lesions within the temporoparietal cortex. The middle panel is patients without visual-field deficits (control group). The bottom panel is the subtraction image of patients showing visual-field deficits minus those without such deficits. It demonstrates that visual field deficits are actually due to damage in primary visual cortex within the occipital lobe. lesion-overlap analyses could have led to the conclusion that primary vision is a function of the temporoparietal cortex rather than of the primary visual cortex.
Another important issue is that lesions may damage not only local neurons but also "fibers of passage." It is also possible that connections from region A support the continued metabolic function of region B, but that region A is not computationally involved in certain processes undertaken by region B. Mechanisms that may produce such an effect include diaschisis (Feeney & Baron, 1986) or retrograde trans-synaptic degeneration. The concept of diaschisis is that damage to the brain deprives other intact regions of normal afferent inflows from the injured area. Thus, a lesion can cause dysfunction of a remote area because of its strong connections with that other area. For example, a PET study of a patient with amnesia demonstrated that a stroke damaging the septum, within the basal forebrain, resulted in decreased activity remotely in the hippocampus (Abe, Inokawa, Kashiwagi, & Yanagihara, 1998) . Even though the hippocampus was not damaged directly, decreased activity resulted because it is anatomically connected to the septum via the fornix. Determination of the neural substrate of the patient's memory loss in this case would be difficult. Thus, patients who are tested in the acute stage are problematic for studies attempting to link structure and function. However, new imaging techniques such as perfusion and diffusion-weighted MRI may allow one to overcome these potential limitations by identifying decreased brain function remote to the infarct observed by structural imaging. Moreover, these MRI techniques can also distinguish between infarcted brain tissue and tissue that may be rescued from permanent damage (see Hillis et al., 2008) .
When tested later after injury, patients' recovery of function may have plateaued and brain plasticity and reorganization may have occurred. At this point in time it cannot be assumed that intact regions of the brain will function in the same way after injury as before (for further discussion of this idea see Farah, 1994) . A relatively new lesion-based method, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), overcomes confounds due to potential brain reorganization because it causes a transient lesion, and behavioral performance is assessed before this type of brain reorganization can occur. Other potential benefits of transcranial magnetic stimulation include (1) the ability to study healthy subjects who do not have additional potential pathologies; (2) the ability to be performed repeatedly in the same subject; (3) the potential to study a larger number of subjects than in a patient study; and (4) the ability to target different locations in the brain of one subject (Pascual-Leone, Bartres-Faz, & Keenan, 1999) . Of course, transcranial magnetic stimulation has its own limitations. For instance, it is not currently possible to accurately determine the spatial and neuroanatomical extent of the disruption produced by the procedure. Moreover, TMS's possible disruptive effects on distant cortical and subcortical areas cannot be ruled out, and the precise physiological mechanisms of action of TMS are unclear. Nevertheless, it is a powerful method for studying brain-behavior relationships (for a review of the types of empirical applications that are possible with TMS, see Sack, 2006) .
Functional Neuroimaging
Numerous options exist for designing experiments using fMRI. The prototypical fMRI experimental design consists of two behavioral tasks presented in blocks of trials alternating over the course of a scanning session, during which the fMRI signal between the two tasks is compared. This is known as a blocked design. For example, a given block might present a series of faces to be viewed passively, which evokes a particular cognitive process, such as face perception. The "experimental" block alternates with a "control" block, which is designed to evoke all of the cognitive processes present in the experimental block except for the cognitive process of interest. In this experiment, the control block may be a series of objects. In this way, the stimuli used in experimental and control tasks have similar visual attributes, but differ in the attribute of interest-faces. The inferential framework of "cognitive subtraction" attributes differences in neural activity between the two tasks to the specific cognitive process, that is, face perception. Cognitive subtraction was originally conceived by Donders in the late 1800s for studying the chronometric substrates of cognitive processes (see Sternberg, 1969) and was a major innovation in imaging (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988) .
The assumptions required for cognitive subtraction may not always hold and could produce erroneous interpretation of functional neuroimaging data. Cognitive subtraction relies on two assumptions: "pure insertion" and linearity. Pure insertion implies that a cognitive process can be added to a preexisting set of cognitive processes without affecting them. This assumption is difficult to prove because one needs an independent measure of the preexisting processes in the absence and presence of the new process. If pure insertion fails as an assumption, a difference in the neuroimaging signal between the two tasks might be observed, not because a specific cognitive process was engaged in one task and not the other but because the added cognitive process and the preexisting cognitive processes interact.
An example of this point is illustrated in working memory studies using delayed-response tasks. These tasks (for an example, see Jonides et al., 1993) typically present information that the subject must remember (engaging an encoding process, followed by a delay period during which the subject must hold the information in memory over a short period of time (engaging a memory process), followed by a probe that requires the subject to make a decision based on the stored information (engaging a retrieval process). The brain regions engaged by evoking the memory process theoretically are revealed by subtracting the blood oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) signal measured by fMRI during a block of trials that the subject performs that do not have a delay period (engaging only the encoding and retrieval processes) from a block of trials with a delay period (engaging the encoding, memory, and retrieval processes). In this example, if the addition or "insertion" of a delay period between the encoding and retrieval processes affects these other behavioral processes in the task, the result is failure to meet the assumptions of cognitive subtraction. That is, these "nonmemory" processes may differ in delay trials and no-delay trials, resulting in a failure to cancel each other out in the two types of trials that are being compared. In fact, this has been shown to occur in a fMRI study using a delayedresponse task (Zarahn, Aguirre, & D'Esposito, 1997) .
Other types of inferential failure should also be considered when interpreting functional neuroimaging studies. For example, there are two main inferences that can drawn from functional neuroimaging data. A "forward inference," which is typical for most imaging experiments, derives from the assumption that if a particular brain region is activated by a cognitive process (evoked by a particular task), then the neural activity in that brain region must depend on engagement of that particular cognitive process. For example, a brain region that responds with a greater magnitude of fMRI signal to face stimuli than to other stimuli (such as cars, buildings, and so forth) would be considered to be activated by face perception. This type of inference was already discussed. In contrast, a "reverse inference" derives from the assumption that if a particular brain region is activated then a cognitive process must have been engaged by the subject during the study. This type of inference is highly prevalent within discussion sections of functional neuroimaging papers. For example, activation within the prefrontal cortex during a mental rotation task (Cohen et al., 1996) might be taken as evidence that subjects were using working memory to remember the identity of the rotated target (this assumption was derived from previous imaging studies that have shown activation of PFC during working memory tasks). It can be shown in general that "reverse inferences" of this type are logically incompatible with simultaneous forward inferences. In our previous example, one cannot be sure that the working memory was engaged to evoke prefrontal cortex activation, since some other cognitive process could have activated this region (D'Esposito, Ballard, Aguirre, & Zarahn, 1998) . For a discussion of potential ways to improve one's confidence in making a reverse inference, the reader is referred to a discussion by Poldrack (2006) .
The Impact of Cognitive Neuroscience Methods
In 2005, Lesley Fellows and colleagues (2005) published a paper that asked the question: What is the comparative impact of the two most common methods employed for studying structure-function relationships in the human brain: lesion and functional imaging? They examined this question by performing a systematic literature review of cognitive neuroscience articles that employed either functional imaging or lesion techniques, published at one of two time points in the 1990s, and assessed the effect of the method used on each article's impact across the decade. They hypothesized that lesion studies would have a greater scientific impact, even though the relative proportion of such studies in the cognitive neuroscience literature had declined since the advent of functional neuroimaging. This is because lesion studies can establish a causal role for a brain region in behavior and thus provide a stronger inference (despite the caveats regarding diaschisis in acute lesions and reorganiza- Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2000 Year 18 tion in function in chronic lesions), whereas functional imaging studies cannot. It was assumed that citation counts would "bear some relationship to the inferential strengths of the cited studies." Contrary to this hypothesis, functional neuroimaging studies were cited three times more often than lesion studies (see figure 14.3) . This finding was primarily due to the fact that functional imaging studies were more likely to appear in high-impact journals and functional imaging studies were less likely to cite studies utilizing other methods.
Anjan Chatterjee offers three potential factors that drive the findings reported by Fellows and colleagues (Chatterjee, 2005) . First, "Novelty is intrinsically appealing." We all believe that newer things are generally better, and functional neuroimaging is the newer thing. Second, conducting research with patients is not easy because the access to such patients is much more difficult than the access to MRI scanners. Third, lesion and functional imaging studies, respectively, tend to test different types of hypotheses. A study of "function" that is typical of imaging studies is to test whether a specific cognitive function is supported by a particular brain region; a study of "structure" that is typical of lesion studies is to test whether a particular brain region is necessary for a specific cognitive function. Chatterjee argues that even though lesion studies have great inferential strengths in understanding "structure," in practice their great strength has been in probing "function." Much of our knowledge about mechanisms of reading, for example, has derived from studies of patients with lesions. As Chatterjee puts it, "Herein lies the great paradox about lesion studies."
Final Thoughts
This exposition of my thoughts on the history of cognitive neuroscience and the approaches we have taken toward studying the biological basis of the mind brings me back to the contributions of Mike Gazzaniga. It is apparent to me that many newly trained cognitive neuroscientists lack exposure to the rich history of patient-based approaches for studying brain-behavior relationships. However, I am optimistic that the astonishing infrastructure that Mike has built over the years will remind cognitive neuroscience trainees that research aimed at understanding the function of the normal brain can be guided by studying the abnormal brain. After all, this is how Mike himself got started with his landmark studies of split-brain patients-people with complete sections of their corpus callosum-which led to enormous insight regarding hemispheric asymmetries (Gazzaniga, 1967) . If Mike had had only functional imaging available to him at the time, he likely would have had a difficult time reaching the conclusions he derived from the observations of his patients. For example, it is well established that many language tasks exhibit bilateral hemisphere activation (Binder et al., 1996) . The incredible insight derived from patients with neurological and psychiatric disorders still provides a foundation for our discipline, and should continue to be an important methodological tool in future studies. It is now one of many tools available to us, and although numerous other writings have paid lip service to the value of the convergence of methods, published studies that actually combine methods remain few and far between. No doubt there are numerous reasons for this, but whatever they are, the time has come for funding agencies and journals to insist on studies that combine methods.
When I took over from Mike as the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, the editors and I asked him a series of questions so that we could learn more about his thoughts regarding the discipline of cognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 2004) , one of which was the following:
Has the conduct of brain/mind research changed since you entered the field in the 1960s, or is the process the same, merely the methods different?
His response:
It is funny you should ask. I recently had the pleasure of being the "wildcard" speaker at the Stanford Neuroscience Retreat in Monterey. The assignment was to reflect on what the future of neuroscience might look like. After the proper caveats that only fools spoke about the future I took my shot at it.
One of the first things I discussed was the fact that scientific enquiry is much less direct and personal and much more interdisciplinary and communal. When I started my graduate studies with Roger Sperry and stumbled into doing the first human split-brain studies at Cal Tech, it was relatively easy and very personal. Everything from calling the patient to conceiving, designing and implementing the experiments were done by me. Nothing was between the scientist and his topic. There were not 6 technicians, complex devices, and a hierarchy of staff to deal with. It was you and the patient. There was no networking and the artificial relationships that arise from that kind of thing. It was all deeply personal and almost private.
Of course, all of this was enhanced in immeasurable ways with daily conversations that sometimes went on for hours with Sperry. He and I had a very personal relationship during my time at Caltech. He was every much a part of the work as I was and his wisdom was all over the place. Sperry was a truly great scientist. That goes without saying. Yet, the actual ability to do the work was much simpler.
So I think the process has changed dramatically. Adding to the process is the content of the questions asked. In the early 1960s the full impact of cognitive science on neuroscience had not yet occurred. Moving out of Stimulus-Response psychology and into the realm of "representations" was a process that took time and to some extent continues until this day.
We may differ in the questions we ask and the approaches we take to study the biological basis of the mind. We may differ in whether we believe what we do should be called cognitive neuroscience, behavioral neurology, or neuropsychology. Nevertheless, I believe that Mike's subtle message in his answer to this question is that we should not forget where we came from as we attempt to move forward.
